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Funky Days Are (Not) Back Again: The Rise and Fall of British South Asian Cultural 
Production1 
 
Well, it seems like the funky days, they're back again 
Funky, funky days, they're back again 
And we're in vogue again 
Before the Ghurkhas get called up again 
‘Funky Days Are Back Again’ – Cornershop (lyrics: Tjinder Singh, 1997) 
 
 
Introduction 
The modern South Asian community in the UK, consisting of multiple national and regional 
identities and religions, has been firmly established for over 50 years. Yet despite this fact 
Asians are still marginalised in the cultural industries, and especially in television and film. 
This was not always the case. In the 1990s there emerged a new generation of British-born 
Asian artists and creatives who made a significant impact on British popular culture. This 
movement in various ways tackled the experience of being racialised as Other in the West, 
but in a way that both transcended victimhood and destabilised the assumptions of whiteness 
that underpin nationalist concepts of Britishness/Englishness. While films such as Bhaji on 
the Beach (1993) and East is East (1999), television comedy sketch show Goodness 
Gracious Me (BBC, 1998-2001), the plays of writer Parv Bancil, the books of Hanif Kureshi, 
                                                 
1 This piece is dedicated to Parv Bancil (1967-2017) 
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and the music of Talvin Singh, Nitin Sawhney and Cornershop (who scored a number 1 
single in 1996 with the remix of ‘Brimful of Asha’) together covered a wide variety of styles, 
genres and politics, what they all had in common was how they were articulating ‘new 
ethnicities’ (Hall 1996) or indeed, distinctly British Asian identities. Yet rather than establish 
British Asians in the cultural industries, dismantling the ‘industry lore’ (Havens 2013) that 
stories about Asian lives have limited appeal to a wider mainstream (i.e. white) audience, 
following this high in the 1990s we instead see a decline in brown cultural production that, 
despite some notable exceptions, continues to this day. In film British Asian directors remain 
invisible, while actors still struggle to get roles, many of whom have in fact turned to the US 
for more opportunities (British Asian actors Archie Punjabi, Parminder Nagra and Riz 
Ahmed have all found success across the Atlantic). In television, while we do see more 
diversity - for instance in competitive baking shows, occasional stand-up specials and 
lifestyle entertainment (which in fact rely on having a variety of social types (Malik 2014: 
34)) - we still learn very little about the actual experience of Asian people in the UK. (In 
music Asian acts remain novel rather than the norm.) 
The aim of this this paper is to explore the conditions that led to the rise and fall of 
British Asian cultural production. Yet this is not an exercise in nostalgia. I acknowledge that 
the development of British Asian cultural production across the cultural industries since the 
1990s is more complex and uneven than such a narrative perhaps allows, though it broadly 
holds true. Nonetheless, the main purpose of the paper is to demonstrate how the practices of 
British Asian cultural producers have been shaped by the political-economic and social-
cultural shifts that the UK has gone through since the New Labour government. In doing so I 
situate this work within the growing body of race and cultural production research (Malik 
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2008, Hesmondhalgh and Saha 2013, Nwonka 2015, Malik and Nwonka 2018, Saha 2018) 
that focuses on the making of representations of race, and how inequalities in the cultural 
industries shape the way that minorities are portrayed in the media. It also adds to the 
literature on creative industries policy in the UK, and the extent to which it is neoliberal in 
character (Oakley 2004, Newsinger 2012, Hesmondhalgh et at 2015). What this paper brings 
to this discussion is an explicit interest in ‘diversity’ and the politics of race in the creative 
industries. While this paper is not intended to be a historical case study, I apply historical 
analysis according to the cultural industries tradition of political economy (Hesmondhalgh 
and Saha 2013: 186), based upon an understanding that at different moments in time, 
different historical forces combine to produce particular social and institutional arrangements 
that shape cultural production. More specifically the purpose of the paper is to explore how 
the changing politics of multiculturalism and creative industries policy came together to 
produce a micro-conjuncture that initially enabled but then ultimately constrained British 
Asian cultural producers.  
 
The rise of new Asian ethnicities 
The 1990s was a fertile moment for Asian cultural production, albeit only momentarily. As 
mentioned in the introduction, this was the decade where filmmakers, musicians, playwrights, 
comedians, and authors of South Asian extraction finally made inroads into popular culture. 
Crucially though, this did not merely entail the odd Sunday newspaper magazine feature on 
the novelty of Asians in the mainstream, or even occasional commercial success, but actual 
cultural legitimation. For instance, in the year 1999 alone, popular BBC sketch show 
Goodness Gracious Me - written and staring four Asian comedians/actors - received the best 
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‘Team Award’ from the Royal Television Society, East is East - based on the play by Ayub 
Khan-Din who also wrote the screenplay for the film - won a BAFTA Award for Outstanding 
British Film, while musician and DJ Talvin Singh won the prestigious Mercury Music Prize. 
This recognition from key UK cultural institutions was the culmination of the innovative, 
highly creative and politically urgent interventions that 2nd generation South Asians had 
been making throughout the 1990s. 
While there had been some significant British Asian work prior to the 1990s that 
achieved mainstream recognition (such as the writings of Salman Rushdie and Hanif Kureshi 
and the artworks of Anish Kapoor), the fact is that up until that point British Asian youth in 
particular were largely invisible in British popular culture. When they did appear in film and 
television, they were often portrayed as victims of racial violence and ‘paki-bashing’, unable 
to participate in British cultural life due to their fundamental cultural difference. These media 
representations were part of a popular discourse that saw Asian youth as passive, conformist, 
studious and uncool, who, unlike their black counterparts had nothing to contribute to 
contemporary British youth culture (Sharma 1996, Malik 2002, Huq 2003). But this changed 
in the 1990s when those Asian youth born in the 1970s started coming-of-age. Following in 
the wake of Afro-Caribbean cultural producers who were creating a distinctly British black 
cultural movement (away from the dominant hegemony of African American popular culture, 
or indeed Jamaican popular culture) (Gilroy 1993), British-born South Asian cultural 
producers, frustrated with the invisibility of brown folk and the stereotyping of brown 
culture, started creating their own unique expressive culture - in film, in television, in theatre, 
in music, in literature, in the visual arts, in fashion - that at once challenged reductive, exotic 
and racist understandings of Asian culture, while at the same time constructing new ideas 
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around national identity. Many scholars drew attention to the radical ‘hybridity’ of these 
cultural productions which, in their syncretic nature that fused South Asian with Western 
cultural influences, destabilised the ethnic absolutisms upon which national categories like 
‘British’ and ‘English’ lay (Back 1995, Huq 1996). The new generation of cultural producers 
were not Asians, but British Asians. As Stuart Hall said at the time, ‘I was writing about 
identity, they were making it’ (quoted in Alexander 2009: 468).  
Much has been written about the cultural politics of this new British Asian ‘scene’, 
mostly lamenting the manner in which its hybrid qualities were quickly commodified, 
subsuming its radical disruptive potential (see Sharma et al 1996). But the concern of the first 
half of this article is to consider what gave this particular generation of cultural producers 
cultural legitimation in the first place? I am working here with Karim Hammou’s notion 
(2016) of cultural legitimation: not just based on the recognition from (white) critics, art 
institutions and academics, but through the manner in which artists and cultural practitioners 
self-commodify, primarily through promotional practices. The emergence of a new generation 
of British Asian cultural producers can be simply read as a natural consequence of what Hall 
(1999: 188) calls ‘multicultural drift’, and ‘the increasing visible presence of black and Asian 
people in all aspects of British social life as a natural and inevitable part of the “scene”’ 
(ibid.); or in other words, by virtue of just being around for 50-odd years. But I argue that the 
new brown cultural producers were enabled specifically by two forces, one socio-cultural 
relating to a new politics of multiculturalism, the other political-economic relating to the 
emergence of ‘creative industries’ policy. Both forces constituted and were constituted by the 
rhetoric of ‘Cool Britannia’, bound up in the ‘New Labour’ project following the election of 
Britain’s youngest ever prime minister in 1997. I argue that ‘Cool Britannia’, for a moment, 
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led to the cultural legitimation of British Asian cultural production, before leading to its 
demise.  
 
‘Cool Britannia’: multiculturalism and creativity under New Labour 
‘Cool Britannia’ was originally coined by the American journalist Stryker McGuire in 1996 
to capture the youthful dynamism of London at the time, reminiscent of the ‘swinging 
sixties’. As Tony Blair toppled the Tory government in a landslide victory, ‘Cool Britannia’ 
became the name of a New Labour campaign to rebrand Britain as young, modern and 
cosmopolitan, representing a break from both Tory conservatism and Old Labour statism. It 
was against this backdrop that the new 2nd generation British Asian cultural producers 
attained recognition.  
These days ‘Cool Britannia’ is mostly discussed in disparaging terms dismissed as an 
empty, superficial promotional exercise that affected little actual material change. But 
nonetheless, it did signal - if only for a moment – a point when Britain appeared to recognise 
and accept its own multiculture. New Labour embraced multiculturalism. As Beynon and 
Kushnick (2003: 231) put it ‘multiculturalism added an important cosmopolitan flavour to 
Blair’s idea of “a young country”’. This had two elements. The first involved a rather 
superficial, exoticised consumption of difference. At best, this recognised the cultural 
contribution of racial and ethnic minorities - culminating in Robin Cook’s famous assertion 
in 2001 that Chicken Tikka Masala was a true British national dish. But secondly, it had a 
social justice element: the MacPherson enquiry into the murder of Stephen Lawrence (a 
Labour party election pledge) that exposed the ‘institutional racism’ of the police force 
seemingly confirmed the government’s progressive stance. It is this shift in the way in which 
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British multiculturalism was understood and more crucially, promoted back to itself, that I 
argue benefited the British Asian cultural scene. While one could argue that the new brown 
cultural producers themselves contributed to this normalisation of multiculture with the 
symbolic goods they were producing that were articulating new multi-culturally inclusive 
(rather than exclusively White) British ethnicities, I would also argue that the 
recognition/legitimation of brown cultural production was helped by a more enlightened 
attitude towards the very fact of Britain's own multiculture  
‘Cool Britannia’ not only evoked a cosmopolitan outlook (though this was quickly 
replaced by a whitewashed version of British cultural history as Britpop came to the fore) but 
also emphasised the centrality of creativity - and the creative industries - within this new, 
modern Britain. The renaming of the ‘Department of National Heritage’ as the ‘Department 
of Culture, Media and Sport’ (DCMS) as Labour came to power was about aligning the party 
with the knowledge economy, but again, also reflected New Labour attempts to create Britain 
as a more cosmopolitan, youthful nation (Nwonka and Malik 2018). Much has been written 
about creative industries policy as a response to industrial decline, reframing creativity in 
terms of economic growth and urban regeneration (Oakley, 2004 2006). But slightly less has 
been written about creative industries and diversity, which was an important aspect of 
creative industries policy, that I again argue briefly enabled the new generation of British 
Asian cultural producers.  
Diversity, defined in terms of openness and tolerance, was key to Richard Florida’s 
(2014) argument for creativity taking a more central role in the Western economies. Diversity 
in this regard has two values for the creative industries. Firstly, diversity has economic value 
(see Newsinger and Eikhof elsewhere in this issue for a fuller discussion of economic 
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justifications for diversity). Chris Smith, head of the DCMS, made sure to mention the 
contribution of Britain’s young multicultural population in his report Creative Britain (2008) 
on the (economic) value of the new creative industries, when he states ‘British bands such as 
Blur, Oasis, the Prodigy, Pulp and the Verve dominate much of the rest of the world. Singers 
such as Roni Size and Jazzie B. are putting black music on the map. And the British record 
and CD industry - as a result of the talent that lies behind it - is one of the great strengths of 
our modern economy’ (quoted in Back et al 2005: 2.1). Thus, these ‘multicultural’ 
performers (neither Roni Size or Jazzie B are ‘singers’ incidentally) in the context of the 
creative industries contribute to the economic growth of the country. Secondly, diverse 
creative industries produce equality in society at large. New Labour’s creative industries 
policy was based on the apparently easy convergence of economic with social/cultural 
rationales. For instance the UK film policy during the New Labour era was primarily about 
realising the industry’s full commercial potential, but also included a remit to ‘support and 
encourage cultural diversity and social inclusiveness’ (UKFC quoted in Nwonka and Malik 
2018: 10). In this way creative industries helped tackle inequality. As Oakley (2006: 262) 
states, ‘The perception that the creative class was meritocratic, open to talent and unlikely to 
be bound by prejudices about race, gender or sexuality, led to the hope that these sectors 
opened up routes to participation among those from excluded groups’. In a similar vein 
O’Loughlin (2006), writing in the context of public service broadcasting, describes this new 
‘flowing’ version of diversity (in contrast to the essentialist multicultural policy that 
characterised the BBC’s approach up until then) as designed to enable the social capital of 
minorities, representing ‘a means to ends such as democratic renewal, social cohesion, and 
economic productivity’ (ibid.: 4).  
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So how did the 2nd Generation Asian cultural producers benefit from this new 
emphasis on creativity (and how did they in turn, shape it)? As Hall acknowledges, this new 
generation of black and Asian cultural producers emerged as a  
 
small but highly-visible proportion especially of young members of the communities 
who have benefited from the greater fluidity of market opportunities in the leisure, the 
consumer and the entertainment industries and in sport, opened up by the 'hustling' 
entrepreneurial spirit which is the legacy of Thatcherism as well as by public-sector 
equal-opportunities policies inaugurated in the 1970s. (1999: 191) 
Hall here alludes to how the motivations of these young creatives aligned with both New 
Labour’s social democratic ideals as well as its neoliberal tendencies. The new British Asian 
cultural producers more specifically were facilitated by two elements of creative industries 
policy.  
First was the stress on independence. The British Asian cultural producers of the 
1990s were effectively members of what Oakley and Leadbetter (1999) called the ‘new 
Independents’ that referred to the emergence of informal networks of creative practitioners 
who value independence and creativity over financial ambition. Indeed, the ‘creative 
individual or independent’ was at the heart of New Labour’s creative industries policy. 
According to Newsinger (2012: 117), small independent producers were considered the most 
appropriate unit of the government’s new creative industries policy, where ‘subsidy is most 
effectively directed in order to drive a host of policy objectives such as economic 
development and efficiency, urban regeneration, cultural pluralism and diversity’.1 Second, 
the new brown independents were facilitated by the emerging cultural quarters in inner city 
areas - areas where there were already strong Asian communities. As Keith (2004) suggests 
ethnic creatives were willing participants in the gentrification of these areas, which in fact 
lent their work or ‘brand’s a certain amount of (sub)cultural capital. As an example, ‘Asian 
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Underground’ club nights such as Anokha and Swaraj worked out of the famous Blue Note 
club in Hoxton Square in Shoreditch, Asian beats record label Outcaste Records established a 
regular night at the Notting Hill Arts Club, and Asian style magazine 2nd Generation that 
covered the scene was run as a start-up off Coldharbour Lane in Brixton. While this on the 
surface seems to relate little to television and cinema, many of the participants on this scene 
went onto forge careers in film/broadcasting. For instance the actor Sanjeev Bhaskar started 
his career in comedy as part of an act with Nitin Sawhney, a Mercury Music Prize-nominated 
musician who had strong ties to Outcaste. Similarly actors Nina Wadia and Meera Syal also 
cut their teeth in the burgeoning British Asian theatre scene. Imran Khan who founded 2nd 
Generation became a well-respected broadcast journalist for Al Jezeera. Independence was 
key to British Asian cultural producers in the 1990s as it gave them the autonomy to self-
represent and self-define and contest the way that Asian communities were being portrayed in 
the media. (Though on the other hand, they had no choice but be independent since they were 
receiving little to no support from established cultural industries and institutions.) Moreover 
as creative industries policy was being implemented, British Asian cultural producers, who 
had been working in DIY, underground contexts found their work finally being recognised - 
at least symbolically rather than economically. My argument is that the new brown 
independents, with their entrepreneurial spirit but commitment to social justice issues 
encapsulated New Labour’s approach to both creative industries and multiculture. While 
creative industry policy didn’t necessarily provide the material infrastructure for the new 
brown independents, it at least recognised (and legitimated) the contribution of the new 
independents to not just British cultural life but the economy itself, whereas before then, the 
contributions of brown cultural producers had largely been ignored. 
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The fall of ‘British Asian’ cultural production 
The end of the 1990s then marked a watershed moment for British Asians in the cultural 
industries where they were receiving cultural recognition/legitimation across a number of 
sectors including television, film, music, theatre and literature. But rather than see the further 
establishment of British Asians in the media, the first decade of the 2000s finds only sporadic 
instances of British Asians cultural production crossing over into the mainstream of British 
television and film. Following the cancellation of Goodness Gracious Me in 2001, Sanjeev 
Bhaskar and Meera Syal found further success with The Kumars at No. 42 (BBC 2001-6) but 
there was little else in television that centered Asianness in the same way. (Later on Citizen 
Khan (2012-16) became one of the BBC1’s primetime sitcoms albeit controversially since it 
is criticised for reinforcing Muslim/Pakistani stereotypes.) Bend it Like Beckham (2002), 
directed by Gurinder Chadha (who also directed the critically acclaimed Bhaji on the Beach), 
was a huge international hit, but she remains the only notable Asian film director (and one of 
the few established female directors) in British film. While one might have assumed that the 
formal recognition and legitimation of the new British Asian artistic and cultural practices by 
the late 1990s would have led to more opportunities for British Asian cultural producers in 
the 2000s, the UK cultural industries seem to be operating a one-in-one-out policy when it 
comes to the representation of brown folk in the media. 
How to read this decline that followed the optimism of the 1990s? Again, according 
to a particular cultural studies approach we might read this in terms of the commodification 
of Asianness; what once began as radical hybridity is transformed by commodification into 
reified, exoticised, absolute ethnic difference. According to this narrative, Asianness was co-
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opted by the culture industry and reduced to a fad that eventually and inevitably went out of 
fashion – as alluded to in the Cornershop lyrics that opened this article. While this is a 
compelling argument it is too simplistic, and as I will show, the contextual approach that I 
adopt here, reveals a more complex picture. As much as British Asian cultural production 
was briefly enabled by new discourses around multiculture and creativity, I argue that that 
these same sociocultural and political-economic forces eventually came together to constrain 
the practices of British Asians, in the process de-legitimating their art which once again was 
treated with suspicion, relegating them back to the margins of British popular culture. 
 
The northern riots and the crisis of multiculturalism 
In terms of socio-cultural effects, 9/11 had a transformative impact upon Britain. But that is 
not to say that Britain was a peaceful, settled multiracial society before this rupture. The fact 
is that even during the peak of ‘Cool Britannia’, structural racism still characterised the 
experience of people of colour in the UK. According to the key social indicators of racial 
marginalisation - stop and search, disproportionate sentencing, deaths in police custody, 
continued racial discrimination in the workplace) – not much had in fact changed for people 
of colour during the New Labour government (Hall 1999, Beynon and Kushnick 2003, 
Kapoor 2013), despite Blair’s claim in 2000 that the party’s ‘record on race relations is 
exemplary and one we are extremely proud of’(Blair quoted in Beynon and Kushnick 2003: 
233). In other words, underneath the valorisation of British multiculture and Macpherson’s 
damning indictment of institutional racism in the police force remained the constant mid-
level hum of racism, both at the level of structure and in the everyday.  
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But in 2001 we see a flare-up in British race relations, specifically tensions between 
the state and Britain’s Muslim community (which destabilises the term ‘Asian’ as British 
Asian Muslims start defining themselves by their religious identity). In the summer of 2001 
riots break out between mostly Pakistani Muslim youth and the police in the northern towns 
of Oldham, Burnley and Bradford, provoked by the far right against a backdrop of severe 
deindustrialization and poverty. The civil unrest in 2001 followed by 9/11 marked a shift in 
New Labour’s celebratory tone around multiculturalism. The new Home Secretary, David 
Blunkett starts speaking out against immigrants’ lack of English and inability (or refusal) to 
integrate, alluding to the backwardness of immigrant cultural practices. Indeed, Back et al 
(2002) identify a return to the assimilationist language of the 1960s. For Modood (2005), the 
riots in the north resulted in a ‘governmental reversal’ (ibid.: 62) in its approach to racial and 
ethnic minorities and the return to a suspicion of multiculturalism especially Muslims ‘who 
seemed to identify more with jihadism than the Union Flag’ (ibid.). New Labour’s superficial 
embrace of multiculturalism is eventually subsumed into rhetoric around a supposed ‘crisis of 
multiculturalism’ that becomes the dominant discourse throughout Europe (Lentin and Titley 
2009). The feeling now is that there is too much difference, and moreover, a type of 
difference that is fundamentally incompatible with European, liberal values and the Western 
way of life. Suddenly, the celebrated 2nd generation British Asian cultural scene of the 1990s 
appears exclusive, elitist and London-centric. As Hall (1999: 188) says of multicultural drift:  
 
Though visibly registering the new play of difference across British society, this 
creeping multiculturalism is, of course, highly uneven. Large tracts of the country, 
most significant centres of power and many so-called 'ethnic minority' people are 
largely untouched by it. Many white British people may accept it as a fact of life, but 
do not necessarily welcome it. Outside of its radius, the practices of racialized 
exclusion, racially-compounded disadvantage, household poverty, unemployment and 
educational under-achievement persist - indeed, multiply. 
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In London the brown kids were dancing, while in the northern mill towns they were rioting. 
In the moment of ‘Cool Britannia’, British Asian cultural production represented a 
momentary challenge to the dominant nationalist discourse that, relying on the binary 
opposition between a (white) Self and the (racialised Other), excluded racial and ethnic 
minorities from ‘the national conversation’ (O’Loughlin 2003). But the buzzing conviviality 
of London’s cultural quarters eventually loses out to the nation’s postcolonial melancholia; as 
Back et al (2002: 26) state, ‘British political life is caught like a grieving child unable to 
move beyond, or let go of, the death of an imperial parent’. Into present times and what Hall 
(1999: 192) initially identifies as an English cultural nationalism (which he goes as far as 
describing as ‘an English “fundamentalism”’) remains in ascendency. Within this context the 
hybrid translations of British Asians no longer have currency, and indeed are seen as a threat 
to a British national identity that needs cohesiveness, not more difference, in these anxious 
times. 
However, this by itself cannot totally explain the decline of British Asian cultural 
production in the 2000s. After all, as Back et al (2002) stress, in the context of the New 
Labour government there is in fact a tension between the party’s postcolonial melancholia 
and the its remaining commitment to social democratic principles (see also Hesmondhalgh et 
al 2015 and Newsinger 2012). This tension is felt particularly acutely in creative industries 
policy. Challenging the idea that cultural policy under New Labour is solely neoliberal in 
character, Newsinger (2012) argues that it is better understood as ambivalent; as much as it 
was about upwardly distribution of income through marketisation, it also emphasises 
inclusion and diversity, even during times of austerity. But the way in which diversity is 
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conceptualised in policy I argue has governing effects upon racial and ethnic minorities, and 
is paradoxically what has impeded British Asian cultural production.  
 
The ascendency of neoliberal ‘diversity’ discourse 
In the first half of this article I argued that the cultural legitimation of British Asian cultural 
production was enabled by New Labour’s vision for a new, young, cosmopolitan and creative 
Britain. The impact made by black and Asian cultural producers in the mainstream during the 
1990s in fact contributed to a shift in diversity policy - which I argue paradoxically resulted 
in their marginalisation. In the 1980s broadcasting and cultural policy was characterised by a 
multicultural approach; ‘strategies used to manage difference’ (Malik 2013: 230) that entailed 
special provisions for specific ethnic and racial groups. While this guaranteed minorities a 
space in the media it was ghettoising, and limited the ability for minorities to gain 
mainstream recognition. In the 1990s the seeds are sewn for a shift to a broader and 
supposedly more inclusive notion of ‘cultural diversity’, that eventually flower in the 2000s, 
fed by the idea that we no longer need multicultural policies because, as Channel 4’s Chief 
Executive Michael Jackson famously put it, minorities ‘“have been assimilated into the 
mainstream of society”’ (quoted in Malik 2014: 32)2. So in the case of broadcasting and arts 
policy we see multicultural provision replaced by the apparently progressive mainstreaming 
of diversity, that in the case of broadcasting was about incorporating minorities into 
mainstream programming rather than making programmes for specific groups. Under 
‘cultural diversity’ policy, the emphasis was now on enabling individuals from diverse 
backgrounds. This entailed a language of access, excellence, education, and in turn 
entrepreneurialism and individualism (see also Oakley 2004). While minorities welcomed the 
16 
‘mainstreaming of diversity’ (as a challenge to cultural ghettoisation), within the cultural 
industries there was now less concern (if there was any in the first place) with tackling racial 
exclusion and discrimination. Advocacy around inclusion appeared to involve (as it still does) 
making a business case for diversity. That is, diversity is conceptualised in terms of how it 
can contribute to originality, innovation and driving competition.  
So how did this impact upon racial ethnic and racial minorities in the creative sector? 
In terms of workforce, while creative industries are seen as promoting social inclusion they 
are more likely to produce polarisation. Research shows starkly that despite the celebration of 
black and (occasionally) Asian contributions to British creativity, the creative industries 
remain overwhelmingly white with minorities disproportionately underrepresented across the 
sector (Oakley 2006; O’Brien et al 2016). But while this might be read as a failure of creative 
industries policy, in other instances creative industries have, I argue, directly impeded the 
type of independent production that flourished to an extent, in the 1990s. Firstly, creative 
industries provision was unevenly distributed disadvantaging minorities outside London; as 
Oakley (2006) argues, creative industries policy favoured certain regions, exasperating 
differences between London and the north in particular. (This again serves to highlight the 
London-centricity of the 1990s moment.) Secondly creative industry policy did little to 
improve the social conditions of independent cultural producers, who continue to experience 
precarity, self-exploitation, insecurity, with racial/ethnic minorities and working classes hit 
particularly hard by this. Thirdly, minorities were more likely to be constrained by the new 
infrastructures put in place in the name of creative industries policy. While the British Asian 
cultural scene in the 1990s was impactful because of its independent, DIY, bottom-up nature, 
top down creative industries policy has imposed a ‘new managerialism’ style, that shifted for 
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instance, artistic/editorial roles in the sector towards more managerial, business oriented 
ones. For Oakley (2004), rather than supporting bottom-up creative initiatives to facilitate 
long term growth, creative industry policy was short-termist and based on implementing 
measures on things (to ascertain ‘impact’) that are not in fact measurable. 
With particular ramifications for black and brown cultural production, I argue that 
creative industries policy, with its emphasis on ‘diversity’ additionally affected the way that 
minorities appear in the media. Mainstreaming diversity has in fact led to a ‘hyper visibility’ 
in television and film of minorities, but often in a superficial way. While we see more black 
and brown faces on screen - whether its on lifestyle shows, supermarket adverts, or American 
sitcoms - we do not necessarily learn anything particular about black and brown experiences; 
as Kohnen (2015: 89) puts it diversity becomes a ‘veneer’ to look at rather than something to 
explore. ‘Colour-blind’ casting - where actors are cast regardless of their racial or ethnic 
profile - appears progressive but in fact fulfils what Jo Littler (2017) calls a ‘post-racial 
neoliberal meritocracy’ - the myth that society is a level-playing field where minorities have 
equal opportunities to whites thus disavowing the structural racism that still blights people of 
colour. As Malik (2013: 228) puts it, in this post-race conjuncture, 'race and racism have been 
driven underground’. But on the other side of the coin, the emphasis on diversity puts 
pressure on minorities to perform their ethnic and racial identity that confirms to white 
expectations. Exploring diversity in UK film policy, Nwonka and Malik (2018), focuses on 
the case of the film Bullet Boy which they argue received funding from the UK Film Council 
out of obligation to fund something diverse; as an anonymous respondent told one of the 
authors, there was an urgent need ‘to get something black made’ (ibid.: 11). Moreover, they 
argue that the funding of Bullet Boy occurred because of the way it reaffirmed certain racial 
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tropes that were acquiescent with white gatekeeper views of what ‘authentic’ British black 
culture is. Thus, an emphasis on ‘diversity’ leads to the overdetermining of race, in order to 
fulfil a particular racial/ethnic ‘tick-box’; under creative industries policy the ability to 
measure diversity is more important than actually dealing with structural forms of inclusion. 
Summing up the contradictions at the core of the diversity agenda Clive Nwonka (2015: 10) 
astutely observes that 'diversity policy is both political and depolitical; political in the sense 
that it is influenced by discourses of social inclusion and multiculturalism, but depolitical in 
the sense that it manoeuvres away from credible interrogations of discrimination into 
concepts of underrepresentation’.  
My argument is that British Asian cultural producers in the 1990s achieved cultural 
legitimation and recognition, no doubt because of the quality of their cultural works, but also 
because of the way they helped realise a new, seemingly radical, vision of Britain, fed by the 
state but reinforced by the media, that foregrounded multiculturalism and independent 
creativity. However, following the summer unrest’s of 2001, and then 9/11, attitudes to 
Britain’s own multiculture were radically altered, less about celebrating difference and more 
about integration and cohesion. Creative industries policy, at the heart of which remains a 
tension between neoliberal goals of upward income distribution and social democratic 
principles of inclusion and access, conceptualises a new vision of ‘diversity’ which purports 
to facilitate inclusion, but in a way that disavows any reference to racism. Moreover, they act 
as a form of governance - or indeed a technique of power as Herman Gray (2013: 784) puts it 
- that reproduces the very whiteness of the cultural industries (Saha 2018), and in addition 
expects minorities to perform their Otherness that conforms to the Eurocentric worldviews of 
white, middle class gatekeepers. Thus while the British Asian independents found 
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legitimation in the 1990s through its seeming alignment with New Labour’s creative 
industries policy, the same policy I argue ultimately constrained the new culturally diverse 
artistic and cultural practices. Newsinger (2012) states that under creative industries policy, 
culture has been instrumentalised for the sake of capital, and we can say the same about race, 
reconceptualised as ‘diversity’. This shift in policy, coupled with a new suspicion of 
multicultural difference I argue has led to the decline of British Asian cultural production in 
the 2000s, even though the end of the 1990s suggested something more optmistic.  
 
Conclusion 
The focus of the article has the 1990s-2000s. So where are we now with regard to the 
representation of British South Asians in television and film? The fact is that Asians remain 
on the periphery except for a few notable exceptions. Comedians such as Nish Kumar and 
Romesh Ranganathan feature regularly in stand-up specials and panel shows, while Guz 
Khan and his BBC3 comedy series Man Like Mobeen (2017-present) has achieved acclaim (if 
not viewing figures) for its portrayal of ordinary working-class Pakistani Muslim lives. Yet 
there is still a lack of (British) brown faces on in film and television (beyond lifestyle 
programming) and a stark absence of brown women and LGBTQ people in particular. 
However, this strangely feels less pronounced now that our cultural diets have become more 
global in character. I am specifically referring to the seeming preponderance of brown folk 
who appear on US-based streaming services in particular– including Mindy Kaling (The 
Office (NBC, 2005-2013)), The Mindy Project (Fox/Hulu, 2012-2017)), Aziz Ansari (Parks 
and Recreation (NBC, 2009-2015), Master of None (Netflix, 2015-present)), Hasan Minhaj 
(Patriot Act (Netflix, 2018-present)) and Kumail Nanjani (The Big Sick (Amazon, 2017)). 
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Much like British Asians in the 1990s these individuals share an urge to transform 
perceptions of South Asians on North American screens that up until recently was still 
shaped by the stereotypical character of Apu in The Simpsons3. Moreover, we must not 
underestimate either the impact of DIY cultural productions on social media, whether 
YouTube, Tumblr or Instagram, where brown youth in particular are making new new 
ethnicities as they create their own content that articulate new sexual, raced and 
(trans)gendered identities.  
Yet returning to the UK, within the corporate or state-funded cultural institutions that 
still dominate film and television production, a neoliberal discourse of diversity remains in 
ascendency. Rather than tackle head on the very real forms of structural disadvantages that 
minorities face, ‘diversity’ serves an ideological function, managing difference in a way that 
maintains racial hierarchies within the cultural industries (Saha 2018). This paper argues that 
the seeds of this approach to diversity were first sewn during the emergence of New Labour’s 
creative industries policy. While it initially led to the recognition of British Asian cultural 
producers who had until that point remained invisible, the same producers were eventually 
de-railed by the de-racialised version of diversity that characterises current cultural policy.  
The aim of this paper was to challenge the idea that as migrant groups become more 
embedded in British society their representation in the media will naturally ‘improve’. 
Multicultural drift is a profoundly transformative force but can only achieve so much, 
especially when up against the archaic forms of nationalism that are activated during crises in 
hegemony. As I argued, particular political-economic and socio-cultural forces came together 
in the late 1990s to create a micro-conjuncture that at once enabled but then constrained the 
cultural practices of British South Asians. Thus secondary aim of the paper is to show the 
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value of a historical approach in the study of race, representation and the media. The field of 
media and race research remains dominated by textual analyses of individual texts, yet I 
argue that it is not enough to just look at representation as though they are created in a 
vacuum. As this paper has shown the need to look at the production of representation, the 
contextual as well as the textual in order to better understand the cultural politics of particular 
representations of race and how they can be transformed. 
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1 Making the argument that New Labour’s creative industries policy was a continuation rather 
than a break from Tory cultural policy, Newsinger points out that the emphasis on creating 
and maintaining internal markets (via high levels of public subsidy), and in turn the adoption 
of casualised employment practices which characterise the new independents, were first 
developed in the broadcast sector following the Broadcasting Act of 1990.(Newsinger 2012: 
117). 
2 While this could be read as progressive, in many ways Jackson’s assertion was somewhat 
disingenuous, as following the Broadcasting Act Channel 4 existed in a much more 
competitive environment where, quite simply, the channel could not afford to cater for niche 
audiences anymore (Malik, 201x). 
3 A separate paper would look at the social cultural and political economic circumstances that 
are enabling a certain section of US-born South Asians - I suspect class plays a significant 
role here 
